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A B S T R A C T
We study the implications of human capital hedging for international portfolio choice. First, we document
that, at the household level, the degree of home country bias in equity holdings is increasing in the labor
income to ﬁnancial wealth ratio. Second, we show that a heterogeneous agent model in which households
face short selling constraints and labor income risk, calibrated to match both micro and macro labor income
and asset returns data, can both rationalize this ﬁnding and generate a large aggregate home country bias
in portfolio holdings. Third, we ﬁnd that the empirical evidence supporting the belief that the human cap-
ital hedging motive should skew domestic portfolios toward foreign assets, is driven by an econometric
misspeciﬁcation rejected by the data.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
“Human wealth is likely to be about two-thirds of total wealth
and twice ﬁnancial wealth. This suggests that the omission of
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1. Introduction
International ﬁnance theory emphasizes the effectiveness of
global portfolio diversiﬁcation strategies for cash-ﬂow stabilization
and consumption risk sharing.2 However, the empirical evidence on
international portfolio holdings favors a widespread lack of diversi-
ﬁcation across countries and a systematic bias toward home country
assets (see, e.g., Coeurdacier and Rey, 2013 for a recent survey). This
discrepancy between theoretical predictions and observed portfolio
constitutes the international diversiﬁcation puzzle (see, e.g., French
and Poterba, 1991).
2 Nevertheless, the size of gains from international risk sharing continues to be a
debated issue. E.g.: Grauer and Hakansson (1987) suggest that an individual’s gains
from international stock-portfolio diversiﬁcation are large; Cole and Obstfeld (1991)
ﬁnd small gains from perfect pooling of output risks; Obsfteld (1994) calibration exer-
cises imply that most countries reap large steady-state welfare gains from global
ﬁnancial integration; Palacios-Huerta (2001) ﬁnds that, for a mean variance investor,
adding human capital to the deﬁnition of wealth generates substantially smaller gains
from international portfolio diversiﬁcation.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2015.12.007
0022-1996/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Moreover, albeit the degree of home bias has been reducing dur-
ing the last few decades, it remains a ﬁrst order characteristic of
portfolio holdings.3
In the major industrialized countries, roughly two-thirds of gross
domestic product goes to labor and only one-third to capital. Thus,
human wealth likely constitutes about two-thirds of total wealth,
suggesting that if investors attempt to hedge against adverse ﬂuctua-
tions in returns to human capital when making ﬁnancial investment
decisions, the mere size of human capital in total wealth makes its
potential impact on portfolio holdings self-evident.
Based on this observation, several contributions have argued that
when the role of human capital is explicitly taken into account, the
observed home country bias in portfolio holdings becomes harder
to rationalize. The argument, originally formalized by Brainard and
Tobin (1992) with a stylized example, works as follows: if returns to
human capital are more correlated with the domestic stock market
than with the foreign ones, labor income risk can be more effectively
hedged with foreign assets than with domestic ones, and equilib-
rium portfolio holdings should be skewed toward foreign securities.4
As emphasized by Cole (1988), “this result is disturbing, given the
apparent lack of international diversiﬁcation that we observe.”
However, as ﬁrst suggested in Bottazzi et al. (1996), human cap-
ital hedging could also lead toward home country bias in portfolio
holdings. For instance, the correlation between domestic return on
physical and human capital can be lowered by idiosyncratic shocks
that lead to a redistribution of total income between capital and
labor. In the presence of these rent shifting shocks, foreign assets
become a less attractive hedge for labor income risk—especially if
total factor productivity shocks are highly correlated internationally.
If the size of the rent shifting shocks is large enough, a situation in
which domestic assets are the best hedge against human capital risk
arises, therefore leading to home country bias in portfolio holdings.
In this paper, we ask whether the human capital hedging motive
is likely to have a sizeable effect on optimal portfolio choice, and
what its implications are for the international diversiﬁcation puzzle.
Moreover, we propose a rationalization of the home country bias,
based on a setting of endogenous portfolio formation and incomplete
markets, that not only can rationalize aggregate portfolio holdings,
but also the variable degree of home country bias in households’
portfolios.
In particular, Fig. 1 depicts a novel (to the best of our knowl-
edge) ﬁnding about households’ equity home bias.5 Panel (a) depicts
the (locally weighted regression of the) share of foreign assets in
U.S. household portfolios as a function of the household ﬁnancial
wealth to labor income ratio. Since (labor income) ﬂows and stocks
(of human capital) are cointegrated, Panel (a) shows that there is a
systematic relationship between household speciﬁc home country
bias and the household speciﬁc ﬁnancial to human capital ratio: the
degree of home country bias monotonically decreases as the human
capital component of household total wealth becomes smaller rela-
tive to the household ﬁnancial wealth. That is, in micro data, when
the human capital hedging motive is more prominent relative to
the ﬁnancial wealth hedging motive, household portfolios show a
higher degree of home country bias. Moreover, panel (b) of Fig. 1, that
depicts the (locally weighted regression of the) number of stocks
3 Coeurdacier and Rey (2013, Table 1) estimate that, for a large set of countries,
the 2008 portfolio share in domestic equity is on average about 71%, with an aver-
age implied home bias (measured as one minus the ratio of domestic equities in the
domestic portfolio relative to the the domestic share in world market capitalization)
of about 70%.
4 Moreover, Michaelides (2003) shows with a calibration exercise that, in the pres-
ence of liquidity constraints, if labor income shocks are positively correlated with
the domestic stock market returns and orthogonal to foreign asset returns, investors
should hold only foreign assets in their portfolios.
5 We are thankful to Laura Bottazzi and S¸ebnem Kalemli-Özcan for suggesting us to
explore this dimension of the data.
in U.S. household portfolios as a function of the household ﬁnan-
cial wealth to labor income ratio, shows that when the households’
human capital wealth is relative larger than the ﬁnancial wealth, the
household portfolio will tend to be overall less diversiﬁed.
Our paper provides a rationalization of both of these ﬁndings,
as well as of the aggregate home country bias, and also shows that
the canonical intuition that human capital should skew portfolio
holdings toward foreign assets, and the related supporting empiri-
cal evidence, are both very fragile. In particular, we offer two main
contributions.
First, using novel estimates of the correlations of human capi-
tal and stock market return innovations, we calibrate an incomplete
market model in which agents face both idiosyncratic and aggregate
labor income risk, as well as borrowing constraints.6 The model is
also calibrated to match the microeconomic (following Gourinchas
and Parker, 2002) characteristics of the U.S. labor income and track
the distribution of the asset wealth to labor income ratios observed
in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
The main ﬁndings of this calibration exercise are that a) investors
that enter the stock market with a low level of liquid (i.e. ﬁnan-
cial) wealth to labor income ratio will initially specialize in domestic
assets and, b) only as the level of asset wealth to labor income ratio
increases do agents start diversifying their portfolios internation-
ally by progressively adding different assets to their holdings, c) as a
consequence, the aggregate portfolio of U.S. investors shows a large
degree of home bias.
What drives these results? Households face large human capital
risk, but this is mostly of the idiosyncratic type—hence underesti-
mated in a homogeneous agent setting. Moreover, in the presence of
liquidity constraints, agents cannot borrow to construct an optimally
diversiﬁed portfolio. Therefore, when their level of liquid wealth
to labor income ratio is suﬃciently high and they enter the stock
market, agents try to minimize the overall wealth risk, investing
ﬁrst in the asset that has the lowest degree of correlation with labor
income innovations—and, as discussed below, this assets is, in the
data, the domestic stock. Only when the ratio of liquid wealth to
labor income is suﬃciently high, and the labor income risk hedging
motive becomes less important relative to the ﬁnancial risk hedging
one, do agents start investing in foreign assets and diversifying their
portfolios internationally. Since the distribution of liquid wealth to
labor income is (in the data as in the model) concentrated in the
region of low liquid wealth to labor income ratios, the resulting
aggregate portfolio is heavily skewed toward domestic assets. Note
that, in the absence of market frictions and idiosyncratic risk, the
estimated and calibrated correlations of labor income and returns
innovations, being very small, would have almost no effect on the
optimal portfolios.
Moreover, since in our model the aggregate home country bias
depends on both the household optimal investment policy functions
and the aggregate distribution of liquid wealth to labor income, a
trend of increasing concentration of ﬁnancial wealth (as documented
by Piketty, 2014), and/or a negative trend in the labor share of
income (as documented by Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2013), would
both generate a negative trend in the degree of home country bias as
found by Coeurdacier and Rey (2013).7
6 We focus on household level liquidity constraint given the widespread empir-
ical support for this modeling assumption (see, e.g., Zeldes, 1989; Iacoviello, 2005;
Attanasio et al., 2008).
7 This also implies that the role of globalization and, more broadly, multinationals,
for the home country bias, cannot be evaluated without controlling for their impact on
the distribution of wealth and income. For instance, if globalization where to reduce
the international diversiﬁcation opportunities, while at the same time increasing the
concentration of wealth and/or reducing the labor share of income, its effect on the
home country bias would be ambiguous.
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Fig. 1. Locally weighted regression of the share of foreign assets, panel (a), and the number of stocks hold by the household, panel (b), on the logarithm of the ﬁnancial wealth to
labor income ratio of the household. Two standard error conﬁdence bands computed via bootstrapping. Estimation based on all the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances available to
date (1992–2013). Year speciﬁc estimates are reported in Fig. A1 of the Appendix.
Since the pattern of correlation of innovations to labor income
and returns plays an important role in our calibration, our second
contribution hinges upon the identiﬁcation of a common misspeci-
ﬁcation that has affected the previous empirical literature, and the
provision of novel estimates that are not affected by this issue. In
particular, we show that the seminal empirical result of Baxter and
Jermann (1997) that, in the presence of a human capital hedging
motive, investors should short sell the domestic capital stock—
implying that “the international diversiﬁcation puzzle is worse
than you think”—is largely due to an econometric misspeciﬁcation
rejected by the data: the assumption that there are neither cross-
country shocks to human and physical capital payoffs, nor common
long run trends. We show that, once this restriction is relaxed, the
effective degree of technological and economic integration becomes
evident, therefore reducing the opportunities to hedge human capi-
tal risk by investing in foreign assets.
Moreover, we also show that there is substantial uncertainty
attached to the estimation of aggregate physical capital returns via
the canonical Campbell and Shiller (1988) cum vector autoregression
(VAR) approach. This feature of the data provides a rationalization
for the apparently contradictory empirical evidence on the correla-
tion between returns to human and physical capital found in the
previous literature (that typically has not reported conﬁdence bands
for the estimated correlations): Lustig and Nieuwerburgh (2008) ﬁnd
a strong negative correlation between domestic returns to phys-
ical and human capital in U.S. data; Bottazzi et al. (1996) ﬁnd
such a correlation to be negative in all the countries they consider
but the United States, where they ﬁnd it to be strongly positive;
Baxter and Jermann (1997) ﬁnd this correlation to be positive and
very close to one for all the countries they consider (United States,
United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan).
Nevertheless, we ﬁnd that by restricting the set of assets available
to hedge human capital to include only publicly traded stocks—
what we consider as the relevant case for most households—much
sharper estimates can be obtained, and these are the estimates used
in our calibration exercise discussed above. We ﬁnd that in this case
human capital hedging can help explain the home country bias in
portfolio holdings—since domestic returns to human capital tend to
be systematically more correlated with foreign stock markets—but,
we show, given the small magnitudes of the estimated correlation,
the effect is quantitatively very small in a frictionless complete
market setting.8 Nevertheless, as discussed above, this same small
correlations have very large aggregate effects in an incomplete mar-
ket settings in which agents face both idiosyncratic and aggregate
labor income risk.
Note that, overall, our result that domestic capital markets con-
stitute a good hedge for domestic human capital risk are in line with
the ﬁndings of a large empirical literature. Palacios-Huerta (2001)
ﬁnds that if human capital is included in the deﬁnition of wealth,
gains from international ﬁnancial diversiﬁcation for a mean-variance
investor appear to be smaller than previously reported. Lustig and
Nieuwerburgh (2008) ﬁnd that innovations in current and future
human wealth returns are negatively correlated with innovations in
current and future domestic ﬁnancial asset returns. Abowd (1989)
ﬁnds a large and negative correlation between unexpected union
wage changes and unexpected changes in the stock value of the
ﬁrm. Davis and Willen (2000), using data from the PSID to construct
synthetic cohorts, ﬁnd that the correlation between domestic labor
income shocks and returns on the S&P 500 is substantially negative
for some categories.9 Moreover, they ﬁnd that for six out of the
eight sex-education groups considered in their study, a long position
on the worker’s own industry represents a good hedge for labor
income risk. The empirical works of Gali (1999), Rotemberg (2003),
and Francis and Ramey (2004) also document a negative correlation
between labor hours and productivity conditioning on productivity
shocks. Coeurdacier and Rey (2013), conditioning on exchange rate
movements, ﬁnd that wages and dividends growth rates comove
negatively for all the countries they consider (also Coeurdacier et al.,
2013 ; Heathcote and Perri, 2013 provide similar empirical evidence).
Theoretically, we show that a situation in which labor income
innovations are more correlated with the domestic payout to capi-
tal than the foreign ones—as we ﬁnd in the data—is likely to arise
8 This is consistent with the ﬁndings of Fama and Schwert (1977).
9 Davis and Willen (2000) generally ﬁnd that the degree of correlation between
earning shocks and equity returns rises with education, with a lower bound correla-
tion of −0.25 for men who did not ﬁnish high school. This is in line with empirical
studies on the labor demand in modern economies that consistently ﬁnd that more
educated workers are relatively complementary to physical capital and the use of
advanced technologies.
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once the degree of international economic integration observed in
the data is properly taken into account. In particular, we show that
very small redistributive shocks (shocks with a variance that is equal
to as little as 6%–11% of the output variance), are enough to make the
domestic equity market the best hedge for human capital risk.
The analysis presented in this paper is part of the literature that
has attempted to explain home bias as a hedge against non-tradable
risks.10 Moreover, the potential rationalization of the international
diversiﬁcation puzzle we document in this paper should be inter-
preted as complementary, rather than alternative, to the ones based
on transaction and information frictions (e.g. Van Nieuwerburgh and
Veldkamp, 2009; Bhamra et al., 2014), nominal stickiness (e.g., Engel
and Matsumoto, 2009), non-traded goods (e.g., Heathcote and Perri,
2013) and more broadly the role of real exchange rate ﬂuctuations
(e.g., Coeurdacier, 2009; Kollmann, 2006; Baxter et al., 1998).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents a calibrated model of human capital risk hedging in which
households face both idiosyncratic and aggregate labor income risk,
as well as liquidity constraints. Section 3 presents the empirical
approach undertaken to measure factor returns and rationalizes the
difference in results between our ﬁndings and the previous empiri-
cal literature. The ﬁnal section outlines the conclusions of the paper,
while a detailed data description, as well as additional results and
robustness checks, are reported in the Appendix.
2. Portfolio choice with heterogeneous human capital risk and
liquidity constraints
In this section we rely on numerical methods to compute the
equilibrium outcome of a model that directly takes into account that
i) most of the human capital risk faced by households is idiosyncratic
in nature, and ii) households’ optimal portfolio choice is inﬂuenced
by liquidity constraints. The simple incomplete markets model pre-
sented below is a generalization of Heaton and Lucas (1997) to
a multiple asset context and of Michaelides (2003), and builds
upon the household income process estimated by Gourinchas and
Parker (2002).
2.1. Model setup and calibration
Each household solves the problem
max{
Ct ,Bt ,Sdt ,
{
Sjt
}N
t=1
} E0
∞∑
t=0
bt
C1−ct
1 − c
subject to the short selling constraints Bt , Sdt , S
j
t ≥ 0 for all t and j, the
period budget constraint
Ct + Bt + Sdt +
J∑
j=1
Sjt ≤ Rft Bt−1 + Rdt Sdt−1 +
J∑
j=1
RjtS
j
t−1 + Yt , (1)
and the standard transversality condition, where 1>b>0 is the
time discount factor (calibrated at the value of 0.95 per year), c is
the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient (calibrated at the benchmark
value of 3), Ct is consumption, Bt is the dollar amount invested in
domestic bonds, Sdt is the amount invested in the domestic stock, S
j
t
is the amount invested in the stock of country j, Yt denotes the labor
income, Rf is the gross risk free rate, Rdt is the gross return on the
domestic stock, and Rjt is the return on the stock of country j.
10 See, e.g., Eldor et al. (1988), Stockman and Dellas (1989), Tesar (1993), Baxter et
al. (1998), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001), Serrat (2001), and Pesenti and van Wincoop
(2002).
In order to model aggregate labor income (Yg) dynamics in a
parsimonious manner, we searched for a low dimensional ARIMA
representation and selected (see Appendix A.2 for details) an MA(2)
speciﬁcation for its log growth rate:
gt+1 = log
Ygt+1
Ygt
= ly + et+1 + h1et + h2et−1 (2)
where et ∼ N
(
0,s24
)
. The individual labor income of agent i is
assumed to follow the process
Yit = Y
g
t W
i
tU
i
t (3)
Wit = GW
i
t−1N
i
t (4)
where Uit is independent of e, N, and asset returns, and logU
i
t ∼
N
(
− 12s2u ,s2u
)
so that E
[
Uit
]
= 1, logWit evolves as a random
walk with drift, logNit ∼ N
(
− 12s2n ,s2n
)
, so that E
[
Nit
]
= 1, and
N is independent of e and asset returns. This speciﬁcation cor-
responds to Gourinchas and Parker (2002) except for the added
term Ygt that reﬂects aggregate economic uncertainty.
11 Following
Gourinchas and Parker (2002) estimates, we calibrate su = 0.073
and sn = 0.105, and we calibrate se , h1, h2, and ly using the point
estimates in Table A2 in Appendix A.2. This calibration implies that
the aggregate labor risk component has a standard deviation that is
of a unit ofmagnitude smaller than the ones of the idiosyncratic com-
ponents. We assume also that log returns on risky assets and shocks
to the aggregate labor income process (e) are jointly normal.
Given Eqs. (2)–(4), the individual labor income growth is given by
D logYit = gt + logG+ logN
i
t + D logU
i
t
and requires the normalization logG = 12
(
s2u + s
2
n
)
in order to
recover the aggregate labor income growth rate as an average of the
individual labor income growth rates.
The model implies the following Euler equations
C−ct = bR
f Et
[
C−ct+1
]
+ kB
C−ct = bEt
[
C−ct+1R
d
t+1
]
+ kd
C−ct = bEt
[
C−ct+1R
j
t+1
]
+ kj ∀j
where kB, kd, and kj are the Lagrange multipliers on the short selling
constraints for domestic bonds, domestic stocks, and foreign stocks.
Let Xt be the cash-on-hand at the beginning of period t
Xt = Rf Bt−1 + Rdt S
d
t−1 +
J∑
j=1
RjtS
j
t−1 + Yt.
Since the utility function implies that there is no satiation in
consumption, the budget constraint will hold with equality and
Ct = Xt − 1{Bt>0}Bt − 1{Sdt >0}S
d
t −
J∑
j=1
1{
S
j
t>0
}Sit (5)
11 Gourinchas and Parker (2002) also add a small positive probability for U = 0,
therefore allowing the labor income to be zero with positive probability.
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where 1{.} is an index function that takes value 1 if the condition
in brackets is satisﬁed and zero otherwise. To solve the model, we
make the problem stationary dividing all the variables at time t by
Zit := Et
[
Yit+2
]
= G2WitY
g
t exp [(h1 + h2) et + h2et−1 + k]
where k = 2ly +
[
1+ (1+ h1)
2
]
s2e
2 . Note also that
log
Zit+1
Zit
= ly + (1+ h1 + h2) et+1 + logG+ logNit+1
Using Eq. (5) and the homogeneity of degree −c of the marginal
utility, we can rewrite the Euler equations as
⎛
⎝xt − bt − sdt −
J∑
j=1
s
j
t
⎞
⎠
−c
=max
⎧⎨
⎩
⎛
⎝xt − sdt −
J∑
j=1
s
j
t
⎞
⎠
−c
;
bRf Et
[
c−ct+1
(
Zit+1
Zit
)−c]⎫⎬
⎭
⎛
⎝xt − bt − sdt −
J∑
j=1
s
j
t
⎞
⎠
−c
=max
⎧⎨
⎩
⎛
⎝xt − bt − J∑
j=1
s
j
t
⎞
⎠
−c
;
bEt
[
Rdt+1c
−c
t+1
(
Zit+1
Zit
)−c]⎫⎬
⎭
⎛
⎝xt − bt − sdt −
J∑
j=1
s
j
t
⎞
⎠
−c
=max
⎧⎨
⎩
⎛
⎝xt − bt − sdt −
J∑
j=1,j=j′
s
j
t
⎞
⎠
−c
;
bEt
[
Rj
′
t+1c
−c
t+1
(
Zit+1
Zit
)−c]⎫⎬
⎭
∀j′ = 1, ...J
where small font letters represent the ratios of the capitalized
variables to the normalizing variable Z (e.g., c := C/Z), and the
normalized state variable x (see, e.g., Deaton, 1991 ; Carroll, 2009)
evolves according to
xt =
⎛
⎝Rf bt−1 + Rdt sdt−1 +
J∑
j=1
Rjts
j
t−1
⎞
⎠ Zit−1
Zit
+
Yit
Zit
(6)
where
Yit
Zit
= G−2Uit exp [− (h1 + h2) et − h2et−1 − k] .
In order for the individual Euler equations to deﬁne a con-
traction mapping for the normalized asset holdings optimal rules
{b(x, e), sd(x, e), sj(x, e)}, we need (following Theorem 1 of Deaton and
Laroque, 1992 ) that
bR
f
t+1Et
[(
Zt+1
Zt
)−c]
< 1
bEt
[
Rdt+1
(
Zt+1
Zt
)−c]
< 1
bEt
[
Rit+1
(
Zt+1
Zt
)−c]
< 1.
Table 1
Preference and labor income parameters.
c 3
b 0.95
sU 0.210
sN 0.146
ly 0.019
z1 0.448
z2 0.094
Mean market return 0.060
Market return st. dev. 0.175
Risk free rate 0.011
Given the assumptions on the primitives and the calibrated val-
ues, these conditions hold and there exists a unique set of optimal
policies satisfying the Euler equations.
To avoid the curse of dimensionality of numerical solutions and,
most importantly, in order to have suﬃciently long time series for
the estimation of the variance covariance matrix of labor income
innovations and asset returns using the unrestricted VAR approach
presented in Section 3 below we focus on four countries: the United
States (as domestic country), the United Kingdom, Japan, and Ger-
many. As we show in Section 3 below not restricting the VAR
representation to have country speciﬁc block exogeneity is both
required by the data, and needed in order to uncover the true degree
of hedging potential via international diversiﬁcation.12
Since the U.S. domestic risky asset has enjoyed both the lowest
variance and the highest Sharpe ratio compared to the other coun-
tries considered, and this pushes the optimal portfolio to be skewed
toward the domestic stock, we calibrate all the countries as hav-
ing the same mean return and Sharpe ratio as the United States.
A summary of the calibrated preference and labor income process
parameters are reported in Table 1.
The crucial element in calibrating the model is the covariance
structure of asset returns and innovations to the aggregate labor
income process. We measure capital returns using broad stock mar-
ket indexes and calibrate their covariance using the time series
sample analogous. The calibration of the covariance structure of
aggregate labor income shocks and stock market returns is summa-
rized by the correlations reported in the ﬁrst four columns of Table 2.
These are based on the estimation approach discussed extensively
in Section 3 below where we show that the (different) estimates
obtained in the previous literature are due to misspeciﬁcation. The
crucial element in Table 2 is that the correlation between U.S. labor
income innovations (fourth column) with the domestic stock mar-
ket is marginally smaller than the ones with foreign stock markets
returns (expressed in dollar terms). Note that these correlations are
all small in magnitude and, as shown in Table A5, would have a very
small effect on the optimal portfolio choice in a complete markets
setting.
As a benchmark, the last column of Table 2 reports the implied
optimal portfolio shares of the domestic portfolio absent any human
capital hedging motive and shows that, according to the estimated
covariance structure of returns, the share of U.S. assets in the U.S.
domestic portfolio would be about 25% in the absence of aggregate
labor income risk.
2.2. Investors’ optimal policy rules and portfolio choice
Having calibrated the model, we can estimate the optimal pol-
icy function by standard numerical dynamic programming tech-
niques (see, e.g., Carroll, 1992 ; Haliassos and Michaelides, 2002)
to compute the optimal consumption and asset holding rules. Since
12 Note also that, according to the 2012 World Bank data, these four countries alone
account formore than half of theworld total market capitalization of listed companies.
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Table 2
Market returns and aggregate labor income shock correlations.
Correlations Implied market
portfolio w.o. labor
income riskGermany Japan U.K. Aggregate labor
income shocks
U.S. 0.57 0.32 0.72 0.04 25%
Germany 0.46 0.51 0.14 22%
Japan 0.41 0.19 36%
U.K. 0.15 18%
the time t optimal policy rules depend both on the normalized
cash-on-hand and on the last labor income shock (et−1), we
numerically integrate out this last variable to have policy rules as a
function of the cash-on-hand only,13 obtaining the investment rules
{b(x), sd(x), si(x)}. Moreover, from Eq. (5) we can obtain the optimal
consumption rule c(x).
Optimal policy rules are plotted, as a function of normalized cash-
on-hand, in Fig. 2. Not surprisingly, the optimal consumption policy
rule has the same shape as in the buffer stock saving literature, with
consumption being equal to cash-on-hand (no saving region) until
a target level of cash-on-hand is reached and saving starts taking
place. Once the saving region is reached, the consumers specialize in
stocks, disregarding bonds. This result, well known in the literature,
was originally obtained by Heaton and Lucas (1997) in a domestic
portfolio choice settings, and it reﬂects the implication of the large
equity premium for the optimal portfolio choice.
More interestingly, when the consumer enters the saving region,
she initially invests only in the domestic stocks and only gradually
diversiﬁes her portfolio internationally as the level of cash-on-hand
increases. This happens for three reasons. First, only a small buffer
stock saving is needed for the agent to protect herself from future
labor income shocks. Second, when entering the saving region, the
agent prefers to invest in the assets that have the smallest correla-
tion with labor income shocks, in order not to increase her overall
level of risk correlated with income. This is due to the fact that,
when entering the investment region, almost the entirety of the
agent’s wealth is in the form of human capital. Hence, for relatively
low levels of cash-on-hand, the human capital hedging motive dom-
inates the portfolio diversiﬁcation motive. As a consequence, the
order in which the agents start investing in the different stock mar-
kets closely match the inverse rank of the correlations between labor
income innovations and asset returns. Third, only for very high lev-
els of liquid wealth to labor income ratio (high x) does the ﬁnancial
portfolio diversiﬁcation motive become more important than the
labor income hedging one, and the agent starts diversifying fully
her portfolio. This is due to the fact that, as x increases, so does the
non-human capital component of the household wealth, therefore
reducing the human capital hedging motive.
Comparing this result with the empirical distribution of cash-
on-hand in the PSID data set, less than 1% percent of the popula-
tion should be investing positive amounts in all four of the assets
considered. Moreover, given the positive correlation between nor-
malized cash-on-hand and asset wealth observed in the data, the
results imply that only the richest households will be diversifying
their portfolio internationally, coherently with the empirical evi-
dence on households’ portfolio holdings at the micro level (see, e.g.,
Jappelli et al., 2001).
13 Optimal policy functions do not seem to change signiﬁcantly as a function of past
aggregate labor income shocks, mainly due to the very small variance of these shocks
compared to the idiosyncratic ones. In particular, policy functions computed assuming
a plus or minus two standard deviation shock in aggregate labor income are almost
identical to the ones obtained after integrating out this variable.
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Fig. 2. Optimal consumption and investment policy functions as a function of nor-
malized cash-on-hand.
Using the estimated policy functions, we can compute the opti-
mal portfolio shares as a function of cash-on-hand. These optimal
shares are reported in Fig. 3. The ﬁgure shows a large bias toward
domestic assets in all the relevant ranges of standardized cash on
hand, implying that more than 99% of the households should have
an asset portfolio strongly biased toward domestic assets. Compared
with the optimal share of domestic assets in the market portfolios
without aggregate labor income risk (25% in Table 2), this repre-
sents a home country bias of individual portfolios that ranges from
75% to 19%. Even investors in the top 1% of the distribution of cash-
on-hand observed in the data would have, on average, more than
50% of their asset wealth invested in domestic stocks. Interestingly,
this large home bias is generated by extremely small differences in
the correlations between labor income shocks and market returns
across countries, and a very small aggregate labor income risk com-
ponent. Moreover, as shown by counterfactual calibration results,14
this effect is mostly driven by the ordering, rather than the mag-
nitudes, of the correlations between labor income innovations and
stock market returns. This implies that small shocks that lower the
correlation between aggregate labor income innovations and market
returns at the country level can generate, in the presence of short
selling constraints and buffer-stock saving behavior, a very large
degree of domestic bias in portfolio holdings.
2.3. Implications for the aggregate portfolio
This subsection derives the implications of the optimal invest-
ment rules, obtained in the previous subsection, for the aggregate
portfolio of U.S. investors.
The standardized cash-on-hand in Eq. (6) follows a renewal pro-
cess and can be shown to have an associated invariant distribution,15
and this can be used to compute the implied aggregate portfolio
of U.S. investors. Moreover, given the estimated policy functions,
the aggregate portfolio can also be computed using the observed
empirical distribution of cash-on-hand.
The implied model distribution can be computed in two different
ways. First, conditioning on a given value for the lagged aggre-
gate labor income shock (et−1), we can use the policy functions and
14 Available upon request.
15 See, e.g., Deaton and Laroque (1992), Carroll (1997), Szeidl (2013), and Carroll
(2004).
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Fig. 3. Optimal portfolio shares as a function of normalized cash-on-hand.
Eq. (6) to compute, by repeated simulation over a grid of values, the
transition probabilities from one level of cash-on-hand to the other.
Tlm = Pr (x = l|x = m) .
Given the matrix T of transition probabilities, the probability of
each state is updated by
pl,t+1 =
∑
m
Tlmpm,t.
Therefore, the invariant distribution p can be found as the nor-
malized eigenvector of T corresponding to the unit eigenvalue by
solving
(
T − I 1
1′ 0
)(
p
0
)
=
(
0
1
)
where I is the identity matrix and 1 is a vector of ones of appropriate
dimension. Since this procedure produces invariant distributions
conditioned on the lagged aggregate labor income shock (et−1 ), we
can integrate out the conditioning variable to obtain the uncondi-
tionalmodel distribution of x.
Second, we can alternatively draw random initial levels of x
to reproduce the initial heterogeneity in wealth among agents,
and then simulate dynamically the evolution of normalized cash-
on-hand over time, generating what we refer to as the dynamic
distribution of the model. We perform both procedures since the
ﬁrst one requires ﬁxing ex-ante the relevant range of x while the
second one instead determines the relevant range autonomously,
therefore providing a robustness check of the construction of the
model ergodic distribution.
Fig. 4 reports the distribution of normalized cash-on-hand
implied by the model and the observed distribution of normalized
cash-on-hand in the PSID data.16 The model seems to reproduce
fairly well the location of the mode and the shape of the right tail
of the empirical distribution, but the model distribution is much less
concentrated than the data around the boundary between the saving
16 The PSID data contain accurate information on wealth holding of households at
ﬁve-year intervals since 1984. Moreover, the PSID provides weights to map the data
to a nationally representative sample. A description of the data is provided in the
Appendix.
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Fig. 4. Model implied and empirical invariant distributions.
and the no saving zone, implying a higher participation rate in the
market than what is observed in the PSID data, probably due to the
absence of stock market entry costs in the setup of the model.
With these distributions at hand, we can compute the implied
aggregate portfolio shares of U.S. investors. The ﬁrst column of
Table 3 reports, as a benchmark comparison, the CAPMmarket port-
folio implied by the calibrated covariance structure of returns in the
absence of labor income risk. The implied aggregate portfolio shares
of the model are reported in the second column. There is a dramatic
effect of labor income risk on the aggregate portfolio with about 95%
of the market portfolio invested in domestic assets. Moreover, the
relative investments in foreign stocks are strongly affected, with a
reduction of the portfolio shares in individual foreign stocks moving
from the 18%–36% range to the 0%–4% range.
Since agents with different levels of normalized cash-on-hand are
likely to have different amounts of wealth invested in the stock mar-
ket, the simple computation of the aggregate portfolio reported in
column two of Table 3 could be a poor approximation of the aggre-
gate portfolio. To address this issue, the third column of Table 3
weights the model distribution by the contribution to the aggre-
gate portfolio of agents having different levels of cash-on-hand.
This weighting of the distribution also corrects for the fact that the
model implies a higher degree of market participation than what is
observed in the data. The weights are constructed from the PSID data
and are proportional to the total stockmarket holdings of households
belonging to each category of normalized cash-on-hand.
This weighting somehow reduces the degree of home bias relative
to column two, but still delivers a portfolio share of domestic stocks
of about 75%, implying that hedging human capital increases the
portfolio share of domestic stocks by as much as 50% and decreases
the portfolio shares of German, Japanese, and U.K. stocks by, respec-
tively, 15%, 19% and 17%.
The last two columns of Table 3 show that our main result also
holds if we compute the aggregate portfolios using the empirical
(again, for PSID data), rather than the model implied, distribution
of cash-on-hand, with (column ﬁve) and without (column four)
weighting. The aggregate portfolio shares implied by the empirical
distribution are, in both cases, quite similar to the ones obtained
by weighting the model distribution (column three) and carry the
same message: the human capital hedging motive generates a very
large home country bias, with an increase of the portfolio shares of
domestic assets between 36% and 50%.
But what is the key mechanism delivering a large home bias
generated by the model in Table 3? The driving force of our
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Table 3
Aggregate portfolio shares of U.S. investors with liquidity constraints.
No human capital risk Model Weighted model Empirical Weighted empirical
capital risk distribution distribution distribution distribution
U.S. 25% 95% 75% 75% 61%
Germany 22% 1% 7% 8% 13%
Japan 36% 4% 17% 17% 26%
U.K. 18% 0% 1% 0% 0%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
results is that small differences in the correlation of aggregate labor
income innovations and market returns, in the presence of short-
selling constraints, lead to a gradual international diversiﬁcation
of investors’ portfolio as their level of normalized cash-on-hand
increases.
In the presence of liquidity constraints, agents cannot borrow to
construct an optimally diversiﬁed portfolio. Therefore, when their
level of liquid wealth to labor income ratio is suﬃciently high and
they enter the stock market, agents try to minimize the overall
wealth risk, investing ﬁrst in the assets that have the lower degree of
correlation with labor income. Only when the ratio of liquid wealth
to labor income is suﬃciently high, and the labor income risk hedg-
ing motive becomes less important relative to the ﬁnancial risk
hedging motive, do agents start diversifying their portfolios. Note
that this is exactly the pattern found in the Survey of Consumer
Finance data, and reported in Fig. 1.
Since the distribution of liquid wealth to labor income is—in the
data as in themodel—concentrated in the region of low liquid wealth
to labor income ratios, the resulting aggregate portfolio is heavily
skewed toward the asset with the lowest correlation with aggregate
labor income shocks. Therefore, the human capital hedging motive,
once market frictions and idiosyncratic labor income risk are taken
into account, is likely to explain a large fraction of the home country
bias in several countries.
The above results imply that domestic shocks that lead to a
redistribution of total income between capital and labor, therefore
lowering the correlation between return on physical and human
capital, are likely to skew portfolio holdings toward domestic assets.
In Appendix A.3 we show that very small redistributive shocks
(shocks with a variance that is equal to as little as 6%–11% of the
output variance), can indeed make labor income innovation more
correlated with foreign, rather than domestic, market returns inno-
vation. Many kinds of shocks are expected to have an effect on the
income distribution that can rationalize the correlations observed in
the data and used in our calibration. Common examples are politi-
cal business cycles and changes in the bargaining power of unions
relative to ﬁrms. Among others, the works of Bertola (1993) and
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) suggest that changes in the time pat-
terns of capital and labor returns may be the endogenous outcome
of majority voting. Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) ﬁnd that in the
United States the average excess returns on the stock market are
signiﬁcantly higher under Democratic than Republican presidents.
Moreover, if nominal wages and prices have different degrees of
stickiness, demand and technological shocks will have redistribu-
tive effects on real payoffs to labor and capital. Supportive evidence
for redistributive shocks can be found in the empirical literature:
Abowd (1989), in a study on wage bargaining in the United States,
ﬁnds a large and negative correlation between unexpected union
wage changes and unexpected changes in the stock value of the
ﬁrm; Bottazzi et al. (1996), using a VAR approach that imposes
block exogeneity across countries (and hence, as discussed in the
next sections, is likely to overestimate the beneﬁts of international
portfolio diversiﬁcation), ﬁnd that the correlations of returns to
human capital with domestic market returns is smaller than the
one with foreign market returns in 7 out of 10 countries in their
study (with an average difference of 0.19); Lustig and Nieuwerburgh
(2008)17 uncover a negative correlation between innovations to
human and physical capital returns in the United States; Gali (1999),
Rotemberg (2003), and Francis and Ramey (2009) document a neg-
ative correlation between labor hours and productivity conditioning
on productivity shock.
Note also that the above results have been obtained without con-
sidering the exchange rate risk connected with the investment in
foreign assets. In the sample period considered, the lower bound
on the estimated standard deviation of exchange rates in the three
countries considered is about one-third of the standard deviation of
market returns. Moreover, the exchange rates show a weakly pos-
itive correlation with the stock market of the foreign country and
seem to be uncorrelated with the U.S. stock market and with labor
income innovations.18 Therefore, adding exchange rate risk to the
model would reduce the Sharpe ratio of foreign assets, making for-
eign investment less attractive and increasing the degree of home
bias.
2.4. Relaxing the borrowing constraints
As a robustness check of the above results we now relax the
short-selling constraint restriction. Relaxing this restriction reduces
the buffer stock saving need, since short-selling increases the house-
holds’ ability of smoothing wealth shocks over time via borrowing at
the risk free rate (i.e. shorting the risk free asset). In particular, we
relax the constraint by allowing the household to borrow (i.e. short-
sell) up to a constant fraction of its annual (permanent component
of) labor income.
Table 4 computes the aggregate domestic portfolio as in Table 3
but considering a different level of households’ borrowing capacity
in each of its panels: in Panel A through D, respectively, short-selling
is constrained to be no more than 20%, 50%, 100% and 200% of annual
labor income.
The table shows that the effect of relaxing the borrowing con-
straints is non-monotonic. Moderate and intermediate borrowing
ability actually increases the degree of home country bias generated
by the human capital hedging motive. On the other hand, allowing
for extremely large borrowing reduces the degree of home country
bias generated by the model.
This non-monotonicity is quite intuitive. With moderate borrow-
ing ability, when the household is suﬃciently wealthy to invest in
the ﬁnancial market, it uses its borrowing capacity to leverage and
hedge further the human capital risk by skewing holdings toward
the domestic stock. As a consequence, the model in this case gener-
ates even more home country bias in portfolio holdings than in the
baseline speciﬁcation with no short-selling (reported in Table 3).
When instead the household can borrow large amounts, given the
large equity premia, borrowing at the risk free rate to invest in stocks
17 These authors aptly title their paper: “The Returns on Human Capital: Good News
on Wall Street is Bad News on Main Street.”
18 Hau and Rey (2006) ﬁnd that, at higher frequencies, higher returns in the home
equity market relative to the foreign equity market are associated with a home
currency depreciation.
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Table 4
Aggregate portfolio shares of U.S. investors with liquidity constraints—assuming that investors can borrow up to 0.2, 0.5, 1, or 2 times their annual income.
No human Model Weighted model Empirical Weighted empirical
capital risk distribution distribution distribution distribution
Panel A: Debt limit equal to 0.2 times income
U.S. 25% 93% 58% 81% 61%
Germany 22% 2% 14% 6% 12%
Japan 36% 5% 27% 13% 26%
U.K. 18% 0% 1% 0% 1%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Panel B: Debt limit equal to 0.5 times income
U.S. 25% 96% 60% 79% 59%
Germany 22% 1% 13% 5% 13%
Japan 36% 3% 26% 16% 27%
U.K. 18% 0% 1% 0% 1%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Panel C: Debt limit equal to 1 times income
U.S. 25% 97% 52% 69% 55%
Germany 22% 1% 15% 9% 15%
Japan 36% 2% 30% 22% 28%
U.K. 18% 0% 3% 0% 2%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Panel D: Debt limit equal to 2 times income
U.S. 25% 89% 48% 57% 50%
Germany 22% 2% 17% 14% 16%
Japan 36% 9% 30% 27% 30%
U.K. 18% 0% 5% 1% 4%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
is an attractive investment (for a power utility investor). Since the
expected utility from the ﬁnancial investment is maximised with a
well diversiﬁed portfolio, a tension between human capital hedging
and ﬁnancial wealth diversiﬁcation arises. As a consequence, when
the household can borrow large amounts relative to the size of its
human capital, the ﬁnancial wealth diversiﬁcation motive reduces
the degree of home country bias in portfolio holdings.
Nevertheless, evenwith the unrealistically high borrowing capac-
ity considered in panels C and D, the model generates very large
home country bias.19 This is due to the fact that the human capital
of the household has a value that is a large multiple of its annual
labor income (formally, the present discounted value of all future
labor income), while the borrowing capacity, in realistic calibrations,
is only a relatively small fraction (or a small multiple in panels C and
D) of the current labor income.
3. Measuring factor returns
To assess the role of human capital in determining optimal port-
folio choice, and in particular to estimate the correlation between
human and physical capital innovations, one needs to study the
time series properties of the returns to human and physical capital.
This task is complicated by the fact that neither the market value
nor the returns to human and (total) physical capital are observ-
able. Nevertheless, total payouts to both factors of production are
directly observable from national accounting ﬁgures. Moreover, total
payouts to the labor force and capital holders can be thought of as
the aggregate dividends ﬂows on the unobserved stocks of human
19 In the Survey of Consumer Finances data (1992–2013), almost all households bor-
row substantially less than 20% of the household labor income (the case considered in
panel A). Moreover, only the calibration in panel A, and to a lesser extent the one in
panel B, come close to match the distribution of cash-on-hand in the SCF data, while
the calibrations in panels C and D generate too low liquid wealth holdings.
and physical capitals. We can therefore use the Campbell and Shiller
(1988)methodology to infer the time series properties of unobserved
aggregate returns from the observed growth rates of dividends on
human and physical capital.
Let P and D be respectively the (unobserved) price and (observed)
dividend of an asset. The gross (unobserved) return R is given by the
following accounting identity:
Rt+1 :=
Pt+1 + Dt+1
Pt
. (7)
Assuming that the price–dividend ratio is stationary, we can log-
linearize Eq. (7) around its long-run average to get:
rt+1 = (1 − q) k+ q (pt+1 − dt+1) − (pt − dt)+ Ddt+1,
where rt := logRt, pt := logPt, dt := logDt, Ddt := dt − dt−1, q :=
1/
(
1+ exp(d − p)
)
, d − p is the long-run average log dividend–price
ratio, and k is a constant.
Rearranging the above equation and iterating forward, the log
price–dividend ratio can bewritten (disregarding a constant term) as
pt − dt =
∞∑
t=1
qt−1 [Ddt+t − rt+t] + lim
T→∞
qT (pt+T − dt+T) . (8)
The equality between the observed log price–dividend ratio, pt −
dt, and future dividend growth rates, Ddt+t , and returns, rt+t , in
Eq. (8) holds for any realization of
{
Dlt+t − rt+t
}∞
t=1 and p∞ − dl∞,
and hence holds in expectation for any probability measure. This
implies that we can take expectations of Eq. (8) under both the
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time t and time t + 1 information sets. Therefore, if we follow
Campbell and Shiller (1988) in assuming that the expected one
period ahead return is constant, Et[rt+1] =: r, and also impose that
the transversality condition holds,20 i.e., limT→∞ qT(pt+T−dt+T) = 0,
we have that
rt+1 − r =
∞∑
t=1
qt−1 (Et+1 − Et) [Ddt+t] (9)
where (Et+1 −Et)[x] := Et+1[x]−Et[x] and Et is the rational expecta-
tion operator conditional on the information set available up to time
t. Eq. (9) implies that, interpreting the total payouts to labor force
and capital holders as the aggregate dividend ﬂows on the unob-
served stocks of human and physical capital, we can construct the
time series of unobserved returns on human and physical capital as a
function of (expected) future growth rates of labor income and cap-
ital dividends. The time series of returns constructed in this fashion
can then be used to estimate the relevant moments for optimal
portfolio choice and human capital hedging.
To make the above approach operational, we need to construct
empirical proxies of the expected values in Eq. (9). We perform this
task following Campbell and Shiller (1988) and use linear projec-
tions generated by a reduced form VAR in a similar fashion as in the
seminal work of Baxter and Jermann (1997).
In order to make our results directly comparable with Baxter and
Jermann (1997) (and, as discussed below, due to data limitations),
we focus on four countries—the United States, the United Kingdom,
Germany, and Japan21 —and the variables included in our VAR are
the labor and capital incomes in each of these countries. But, dif-
ferently from Baxter and Jermann, our empirical procedure allows
for common international shocks, comovements, and trends among
countries and, as shown in Section 3.1, this difference leads to a sharp
difference in results. In particular, the econometric speciﬁcation used
by Baxter and Jermann (1997) relies on the block exogeneity of
each country in a VAR framework. Their procedure of estimating a
vector error correction model (VECM), a particular case of VAR, sep-
arately for each of the four countries is analogous to estimating a
VECM for all the countries under the assumption that each country is
block exogenous with respect to the other countries. This approach
embeds the assumption of low international economic integration.
Their VECM, for each country i, takes the form:
[
DdiL,t+1
DdiK,t+1
]
=
[
ciL
ciK
]
+
[
xiLL(L) x
i
LK(L)
xiKL(L) x
i
KK(L)
][
DdiL,t
DdiK,t
]
(10)
+
[
giL
giK
] (
diL,t − diK,t
)
+
[
eiL
eiK
]
where diL,t denotes the log of labor income, d
i
K,t denotes the log of
capital income, ciL and c
i
K are constant terms, Dd
i
L,t+1 ≡ diL,t+1 − diL,t ,
DdiK,t+1 ≡ diK,t+1 −diK,t , and the x..(L) terms are polynomials in the lag
operator L. The rationale for imposing a cointegration vector of the
form [1,−1] is that if labor and capital income are allowed to have
independent trends (whether deterministic or stochastic), the labor
share of income within a country will reach 1 or 0 with probability
1 as the sample size goes to inﬁnity. Appendix A.4 reports a formal
empirical analysis of this assumption.
20 Imposing that the transversality condition holds is less restrictive than it might
seem since, even though it rules out intrinsic bubbles as the ones analyzed in Froot and
Obstfeld (1991), it does not rule out the presence of mispricings in the asset markets
(Campbell and Vuolteenaho, 2004; Brunnermeier and Julliard, 2008).
21 Baxter and Jermann (1997) focus on this sample since they estimate the cumula-
tive share of these four countries in the world portfolio to be around 93%.
Eq. (10) can be rewritten in more compact form as:
DDit+1 = C
i +Xi(L)DDit +P
i
(
diL,t − diK,t
)
+ mit+1 (11)
where
DDit+1 =
[
DdiL,t+1
DdiK,t+1
]
, Ci =
[
ciL
ciK
]
, Xi(L) =
[
xiLL(L) x
i
LK(L)
xiKL(L) x
i
KK(L)
]
,
Pi =
[
giL
giK
]
, mit+1 =
[
eiL
eiK
]
.
Using this notation and deﬁning DDt+1 and C as the vectors contain-
ing DDit+1 and C
i for each of the four countries considered, the VECM
estimated by Baxter and Jermann (1997) can be rewritten as a system
of the form
DDt+1 = C +
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
X1(L) 0 0 0
0 X2(L) 0 0
0 0 X3(L) 0
0 0 0 X4(L)
⎤
⎥⎥⎦DDt
+
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
P1
(
d1L,t − d1K,t
)
P2
(
d2L,t − d2K,t
)
P3
(
d3L,t − d3K,t
)
P4
(
d4L,t − d4K,t
)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦+
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
m1t+1
m2t+1
m3t+1
m4t+1
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ (12)
where the 0 elements are 2 × 2 matrices of zeros.
There are two important implicit restrictions in Eq. (12). First, the
ﬁrst matrix on the right-hand side of the equation has all the off-
diagonal matrices restricted to be zero, i.e., each country is assumed
to be block exogenous with respect to the other countries: the ﬁrst
differences of log labor and log capital income of each country are not
supposed to Granger-cause the ﬁrst differences of log labor and log
capital income in other countries. Second, the cointegration struc-
ture in the second term on the right-hand side of Eq. (12) rules
out cross-country cointegrations between incomes of the factors of
production—that is, it rules out international common trends (e.g., it
rules out that capital income in different countries follows the same
long-run stochastic trend). Our empirical analysis in the next subsec-
tion relaxes both of these restrictions and considers a more general
class of VAR models for labor and capital incomes that allow for
short- and long-run comovements across countries.
3.1. Empirical evidence: a reappraisal
We estimate Eqs. (9) and (12), as well as alternative VAR speciﬁ-
cations, using annual data on labor income and capital income from
OECD National Accounts for Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom,
and the United States over the period 1960–2012. Our measure of
labor income is total employee compensation. This is a less than ideal
measure in that it is likely to contain components that are not purely
compensation to labor (e.g. thewage bill received by an entrepreneur
might contain capital compensation components), and consequently
the literature has developed more accurate measures of compensa-
tion to labor (see, e.g., Gopinath et al., 2015). Nevertheless, using
more accuratemeasures of wage compensationwould require focus-
ing on much shorter time series: depending on the approach, we
would lose between 39 and 75 per cent of the time series dimen-
sion, and in such a reduced sample it would not be feasible to test
for block exogeneity since the number of parameters to be estimated
would be too large relative to the number of observations. Similarly,
we are constrained to use a relatively small cross-section of coun-
tries (that, nevertheless, account more than half of the world equity
market capitalization at the end of our sample, and more than 90%
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Table 5
Testing block exogeneity.
Test statistic
Likelihood ratio 83.7
(0.001)
Wald 91.8
(0.000)
Lagrange multiplier 71.2
(0.016)
Note: Tests for the block exogeneity restriction for the VECM in Eq.
(12). p-value of not rejecting the null hypothesis is in brackets.
of the world capitalization at the beginning of the sample), since
expanding to more countries would not only substantially increase
the number of parameters to be estimated in each equation of the
VAR system,22 but also shorten the available time series since the
countries we consider are exactly the ones with the longest available
history of wage bill data. This data limitation, nevertheless, has the
advantage of making our results directly comparable to the previous
literature and, in particular, to Baxter and Jermann (1997) since we
use exactly the same set of countries and deﬁnition of the wage bill.
Our baseline measure of capital income is GDP at factor cost
minus employee compensation. A detailed description of the dataset
is given in Appendix A.1.
3.1.1. Model selection
The restrictions imposed in Eq. (12) by Baxter and Jermann (1997)
can be formally tested against more general speciﬁcations that allow
for international comovements in the payoffs to the factor of produc-
tion.We start by assessing whether the block exogeneity assumption
is supported by the data. Table 5 reports frequentist tests of the
null hypothesis of block exogeneity in Eq. (12). Both restricted and
unrestricted speciﬁcations are estimated with only one lag (as in
Baxter and Jermann, 1997), and we maintain the hypothesis of coin-
tegration relationships only within the countries as in Eq. (12). As
stressed by the p-values reported under the test statistics, the null
hypothesis of block exogeneity is rejected at any standard conﬁdence
level. That is, the data suggest that there exist statistically signiﬁ-
cant cross-country links between the compensations of the factors of
production.
Next, we want to relax the hypothesis of only within countries
cointegration relationships. That is, we want to allow for cross-
country common trends across variables. Since any possible VECM
representation of the data would have a one-to-one mapping to a
corresponding VAR model in levels of log labor and capital income,
we do so by considering this last class of models. In comparing VARs
in levels against other speciﬁcations, we need to be careful about the
unit roots in the labor and capital income series. 23 As a consequence,
we perform model comparison employing Bayesian posterior prob-
abilities (see, e.g., Gelman et al., 1995) since this approach is robust
to non-stationarity in the data. In particular, for each model j consid-
ered, we compute the Bayes factor
BFj =
∫
Hj
gj(h)pj(X | h)dh (13)
where pj(X | h) is the likelihood function of the data, X, h is a vec-
tor of parameters belonging to the space Hj, and gj(h) is a prior
on the distribution of the parameters of the jth model. Using the
22 E.g., adding even only one country to our setting would imply, in the best speci-
ﬁcation case of Table 6 below estimating an additional 23 parameters—i.e. a dramatic
reduction in degrees of freedom given the size of the time series dimension of the data
(52 years of annual observations).
23 The unit root hypothesis cannot be rejected for all the data series considered.
Laplace method (see, e.g., Schervish, 1995) the Bayes factor can be
approximated as
BFj ∼= gj(hˆj)p(X | hˆj)(2p)m2
∣∣∣Sˆhj∣∣∣ 12 (14)
where pj(X | hˆj) is the likelihood of the j model evaluated at its peak
hˆj, m is the dimension of Hj, and Sˆhj is the observed information
matrix. Note that the above approximation is accurate even in the
presence of unit roots (see, e.g., Kim, 1994).
With the Bayes factors at hand, the posterior probability of each
model j is computed as
POj =
pjBFj∑
ipiBFi
(15)
where pj is the prior probability of the jth model.
Table 6 reports the logs of the Bayes factor and the posterior
probabilities deﬁned by Eqs. (14) and (15) for a large set of mod-
els, under the assumption of ﬂat priors and equal prior probability
for each model. The models considered are as follows: i) vector
error correction models—with (row 1) and without (row 2) block
exogeneity restrictions—in which, as in Baxter and Jermann (1997),
the only cointegrations allowed are within country and the ﬁxed
cointegration vector has the form [1,−1]; ii) VARs in levels with the
block exogeneity restriction which relax the assumption of having
a cointegration vector of the form [1,−1] (rows 3 and 4); iii) VARs
in ﬁrst differences (with, row 5, and without, row 6, block exogene-
ity) which rule out any form of cointegration among variables; and
iv) unrestricted VARs in levels (rows 7 and 8) that allow for interna-
tional comovements and arbitrary cross-countries—as well as within
country—cointegration relationships. The maximum number of lags
considered for each speciﬁcation is naturally restricted by the sam-
ple size at hand, but nevertheless corresponds to the one chosen by
Akaike and Bayesian information criteria.
The econometric model considered in row 1 of Table 6 corre-
sponds to the original Baxter and Jermann (1997) speciﬁcation. The
second row shows that relaxing the block exogeneity assumption
leads to a dramatic increase in the log Bayes factor (logBFi). This
increase is so large that if the models in the ﬁrst two rows were
the only ones considered, we would assign a posterior probability
of about one to the speciﬁcation that—unlike Baxter and Jermann—
Table 6
Log Bayes factors and posterior probabilities.
Row Speciﬁcation log BFj POj
(1) VECM with block exogeneity, domestic
cointegration, one lag
724.35 1.26e − 51
(2) VECM without block exogeneity,
domestic cointegration, one lag
790.15 4.76e − 23
(3) VAR in levels with block exogeneity, one
lag
701.22 1.14e − 61
(4) VAR in levels with block exogeneity, two
lags
725.06 2.63e − 51
(5) VAR in ﬁrst-differences with block
exogeneity, one lag
717.51 1.38e − 54
(6) VAR in ﬁrst-differences without block
exogeneity, one lag
781.58 9.02e − 27
(7) VAR in levels without block exogeneity,
one lag
769.23 3.91e − 32
(8) VAR in levels without block exogeneity,
two lags
841.55 1
Note: Logs of Bayes factors and posterior probabilities. The posterior probabilities do
not sum up to 1 because of rounding error.
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allows for international comovements among variables. That is,
Bayesian testing conﬁrms the strong rejection of the block exogene-
ity assumptions delivered by frequentist testing presented in Table 5.
The models considered in the third and fourth rows maintain the
block exogeneity assumption but, by considering VARs in levels, do
not restrict the within country cointegration vector to take the form
[−1, 1]. The Bayes factors of these speciﬁcations are of similar magni-
tude to the one in the ﬁrst row, but much smaller than the one in the
second row, providing additional evidence of a strong rejection of the
block exogeneity assumption. The VARs in ﬁrst differences with and
without block exogeneity in rows 5 and 6 are relevant because they
impose the restriction of no cointegration among variables. Since the
Bayes factor in row 5 is smaller than the one in row 1, and the one in
row 6 is smaller than the one in row 2, the data provide supporting
evidence for within country cointegration in the payoffs to physi-
cal and human capital. Nevertheless, in Appendix A.4, we report a
detailed frequentist analysis of within country cointegration and ﬁnd
mixed evidence in support of this hypothesis: the [−1, 1] cointegra-
tion vector is always rejected except for Japan, while relaxing this
parameter restriction the results vary from country to country and
with the lag length considered.
Finally, the speciﬁcation in rows 7 and 8 of Table 6 are unre-
stricted VARs in levels with one and two lags, respectively. These
speciﬁcations allow for arbitrary cointegration within and, most
importantly, across countries—that is, the variables are allowed to
show both short- and long-run systematic comovements across
countries. The speciﬁcationwith two lags (which can bemapped into
a VECM) in row 8 delivers a Bayes factor that is substantially higher
compared to all the other models considered. This large Bayes fac-
tor maps into a posterior probability (POj in the second column of
Table 6) that is numerically indistinguishable from 1. That is, the data
provide strong evidence of both short- and long-run cross-country
comovements in the payoffs to human and physical capital, imply-
ing that the econometric model of Baxter and Jermann (1997)—that
rules out both of these channels—is misspeciﬁed.
To test the robustness of the above results, we use numerical inte-
gration of Eq. (13) (we used an importance sampling approach based
on the asymptotic Normal-inverse-Wishart shape of the posterior to
perform this task) to get alternative estimates of the Bayes factors
and posterior probabilities in Table 6. We also experimented with
non-ﬂat priors over the parameters space. In both cases, the results
are in line with the ones in Table 6.
Overall, the results of this subsection imply that to accurately
measure returns to human and physical capital, and their implica-
tions for international portfolio diversiﬁcation, we should use an
econometric speciﬁcation that, differently from the ones used in the
previous literature, allows for both short- and long-run international
comovements in the payoffs to production factors.
3.1.2. The correlation of human and physical capital returns
In order to estimate factor returns using Eq. (9) and the selected
VAR model, we calibrate the parameters q to 0.957 for both capi-
tal and labor income. This corresponds to assuming that the mean
dividend–price ratio of labor income and capital income are identical
and equal to 4.5% as in Baxter and Jermann (1997). Moreover, note
that ﬁniteness of the empirical estimate of the right-hand side of Eq.
(9) is guaranteed if q times the largest eigenvalue of the compan-
ion matrix of the selected VAR model is within the unit circle. This
condition is satisﬁed by our choice of q.
Table 7 reports the correlations between returns on capital and
labor computed using Eq. (9) and the estimations of expected Dd’s by
the VAR in levels speciﬁcation with two lags.
The correlations are both qualitatively and quantitatively
different from the ones derived by Baxter and Jermann (1997).
The within countries correlations seem to be somewhat lower com-
pared to Baxter and Jermann (1997): their estimates cover the range
Table 7
Correlation of factor returns.
rGK r
J
L r
J
K r
UK
L r
UK
K r
USA
L r
USA
K
rGL 0.761[0.3,0.94]
0.701
[0.2,0.94]
0.828
[0.59,0.97]
0.727
[0.26,0.95]
0.747
[0.28,0.94]
0.847
[0.55,0.97]
0.808
[0.42,0.96]
rGK 0.144[−0.55,0.73]
0.725
[0.14,0.95]
0.869
[0.55,0.99]
0.986
[0.95,1]
0.933
[0.76,0.99]
0.977
[0.92,1]
rJL 0.666[0.15,0.93]
0.155
[−0.53,0.77]
0.170
[−0.52,0.74]
0.311
[−0.4,0.83]
0.239
[−0.48,0.78]
rJK 0.524[−0.11,0.93]
0.751
[0.2,0.96]
0.738
[0.27,0.97]
0.739
[0.22,0.96]
rUKL 0.861[0.55,0.99]
0.945
[0.8,0.99]
0.918
[0.73,0.99]
rUKK 0.933[0.77,0.99]
0.982
[0.94,1]
rUSAL 0.964[0.87,0.99]
Note: Correlations of human capital returns with physical capital returns. Factor
returns are estimated using a VAR speciﬁcation in levels with two lags. We report in
brackets the 95% conﬁdence interval constructed using sampling-with-replacement
raw residuals bootstrap based on 10,000 replications.
[0.78, 0.99], while our estimates have a maximum of 0.96 and a
minimum of 0.67 in Japan.24
The between countries correlations appear to be higher compared
to Baxter and Jermann (1997): their maximum correlation between
returns on capital is 0.43 (U.S.–Germany), the maximum correlation
between returns on labor is 0.35 (U.S.–Germany), the maximum cor-
relation between domestic labor returns and foreign capital returns
is 0.40 (Germany–U.S.).
In our estimation, the between countries correlations for both rL
and rK are much higher (with the exception of Japan, where the cor-
relations between labor returns and foreign returns on both capital
and labor are generally lower). The correlations between returns on
capital, for example, cover the range [0.73, 0.98]. Moreover, for all
countries but Japan, the correlations between domestic returns on
labor and foreign returns on capital are similar to the correlation
between domestic returns on labor and capital. These results sug-
gest the presence of productivity shocks effective at the international
levels.
The factor returns that we obtain by applying Eq. (9) are gen-
erated regressors (Oxley and McAleer, 1993). To account for this,
we compute the standard errors of the corresponding correlation
matrix using a bootstrap approach to statistical inference (see, e.g.,
Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). More speciﬁcally, we apply a sampling-
with-replacement raw residuals bootstrap scheme with 10,000 rep-
etitions. Interestingly, as shown in Table 7, we ﬁnd large empirical
conﬁdence intervals. For Japan, the conﬁdence intervals indicate that
the correlation between factor returns may be either positive or
negative. In other words, we document the existence of substantial
statistical uncertainty on measuring returns to the aggregate capital
stock.
The differences between our point estimates and the results of
Baxter and Jermann (1997) are mostly driven by the relaxation of
the block exogeneity assumption, which turns out to be strongly
rejected by the data. Baxter and Jermann (1997) ﬁt a model where
they restrict the countries not to be economically and technologically
integrated. As an outcome, the level of between countries correlation
is underestimated and the within country correlation is overesti-
mated (i.e., the countries appear not to be integrated). Once this
restriction is removed, the effective degree of technological and eco-
nomic integration becomes evident. This high degree of economic
integration implies fewer opportunities to hedge the human capital
risk investing in foreign marketable assets.
24 Bottazzi et al. (1996) estimate a negative correlation between wage rate and
domestic proﬁt rate. Their estimations are much more in line with the within country
correlations reported in Table 3 than with the ones reported by Baxter and Jermann
(1997).
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For comparability, in Table A5 of Appendix A.6, we replicate the
optimal portfolio implied by the complete spanning approach of
Baxter and Jermann (1997). That is, we replicate the authors’ main
result, but after correcting their VAR misspeciﬁcation (i.e. we use the
VAR speciﬁcation in Row (8) of Table 6). Raw point estimates indi-
cate that the authors’ original claim, i.e. that the home country bias
is generally worsened by the human capital hedging motive, is not
generally supported by the data: the table shows that, for some coun-
tries, we obtain exactly the opposite effect. Moreover, conﬁdence
intervals show that there is substantial uncertainty about optimal
portfolios constructed with this approach, and that human capital
hedging can potentially generate large home country bias.25
3.1.3. The correlation of human capital and stock market returns
Estimating returns to physical capital using the approach in
Eq. (9) might be inappropriate for evaluating international portfolio
diversiﬁcation, since i) only a subset of the claims to capital com-
pensation in a country are tradable internationally with relatively
little frictions—i.e., the ones of publicly traded companies, and ii)
due to tax advantages, the compensation to capital elicited from
national accounts tends to include de facto components of human
capital compensation (e.g., for family owned and individual ﬁrms).
As a consequence, a more appropriate measure of the correlation
between human and physical capital compensations can be con-
structed replacing the VAR based estimates of returns to capital with
the returns on broad stock market indices. In this subsection, we
restrict the set of assets available to hedge human capital to include
only publicly traded stocks, since we consider this as being the rel-
evant case for most households. The innovations to human capital
compensation are estimated as in the previous subsections.
Table 8 reports the correlations between the returns to human
capital and returns to the stock market. Since the correlation
between U.S. human capital innovations and stock returns plays a
key role in the model calibration presented in Section 2, for the
United States we use three different stock indices: the Fama and
French (1992) benchmark market return,26 the S&P 500 index, and
the Dow Jones Industrial index.
Overall, the table suggests that domestic returns to human cap-
ital are in general more correlated with foreign stock markets: for
all countries considered, the asset with the highest correlation with
human capital returns is always a foreign asset. Moreover, in the
United States in particular, returns to human capital have the low-
est correlation with the domestic, rather than the foreign, stock
market index. However, the estimated correlations tend to be quan-
titatively small (this is consistent with the ﬁndings of Fama and
Schwert (1977)), and the uncertainty attached to the estimation of
human capital delivers large conﬁdence intervals (in particular, only
one of the estimated correlation coeﬃcients is different from zero
at the 95% conﬁdence level). Nevertheless, as shown in Table A4
of Appendix A.5, despite the large conﬁdence intervals, the pattern
of lower correlation of human capital with domestic, rather than
foreign, returns, is quite robust to alternative construction of the
data.
The small correlations in the tables have two important implica-
tions. First, when focusing on tradable claims to physical capital, the
assumption of complete spanning for human capital return used in
the previous literature seems to be unsupported by the data. Second,
if one were to use a value weighted approach for the determination
of optimal portfolios as in Baxter and Jermann (1997), the effect of
25 This last ﬁnding also reconciles the discrepancy between the optimal portfolios
estimated in Baxter and Jermann (1997), and the ones constructed by Bottazzi et al.
(1996).
26 This is a very broad index that covers includes all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ
ﬁrms and is available fromKenneth French’s website: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/
pages/faculty/ken.french/
Table 8
Correlation of factor returns using stock market data.
rGL r
J
L r
UK
L r
USA
L
rGK 0.118[−0.08,0.24]
0.138
[−0.8,0.24]
0.110
[−0.07,0.26]
0.145
[−0.04,0.27]
rJK 0.122[−0.05,0.21]
0.071
[−0.09,0.19]
0.145
[−0.02,0.23]
0.194
[0.03,0.26]
rUKK 0.130[−0.09,0.26]
0.105
[−0.12,0.23]
0.101
[−0.10,0.27]
0.149
[−0.06,0.29]
rUSAFF 0.000[−0.14,0.11]
−0.088
[−0.20,0.04]
0.031
[−0.10,0.15]
0.041
[−0.10,0.14]
rUSADJ −0.017
[−0.18,0.12]
−0.147
[−0.27,0.01]
0.035
[−0.07,0.21]
0.006
[−0.10,0.18]
rUSASP 0.026[−0.11,0.12]
−0.076
[−0.19,0.05]
0.075
[−0.05,0.17]
0.070
[−0.06,0.16]
Note: Correlations of human capital returns with physical capital returns. Returns to
human capital are estimated using a VAR speciﬁcation in levels with two lags. Returns
on physical capital are computed using stock market data (CDAX for Germany; Nikko
Securities Composite for Japan; FTSE All-Share Index for United Kingdom; Fama and
French (FF), S&P 500 Total Return Index (SP), and Dow Jones Industrials Total Return
Index (DJ) for the United States). We report in brackets the 95% conﬁdence inter-
val constructed using sampling-with-replacement raw residuals bootstrap based on
10,000 replications.
human capital hedging would be very small, but it would tend to
skew holdings in favor of domestic assets, as shown in Table A5 in
Appendix A.6.
For robustness, we have also estimated the correlations in Table 8
using two subsamples of equal length (pre and post 1987). The cor-
relations in the two subsample are not statistically different from
the full sample ones, albeit smaller in the second subsample. More
importantly, the subsample estimates highlight the same pattern as
in Table 8: labor income innovations tend to be more correlated with
foreign stock markets than domestic ones. 27
Nevertheless, as we have shown in Section 2 above in the pres-
ence of borrowing constraints and both aggregate and idiosyncratic
human capital risk, even the above small correlations can have a very
large impact on optimal portfolio decisions.
4. Conclusion
This paper shows that human capital risk can help rationalize
the home country bias in equity holdings at both the aggregate and
household levels. First, we show that the theoretical intuition that
short positions in domestic physical assets are a good hedge for
human capital risk is a very fragile one, as very small redistribu-
tive shocks—e.g., with a variance of a mere 6% of GDP variance—are
enough to reverse this intuition. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the presence
of this type of shocks is supported by the data.
Second, we show that the commonly used approach of estimat-
ing country-speciﬁc VARs to compute returns to human and physical
capital is rejected by the data and delivers mechanically biased
estimates of the hedging beneﬁts of shorting the domestic capi-
tal. Most importantly, we show that this misspeciﬁcation largely
drives the ﬁndings of Baxter and Jermann (1997)—i.e., the result that
the home bias puzzle is unequivocally worse than we think once
we consider human capital risk, is the outcome of an econometric
misspeciﬁcation strongly rejected by the data.
Moreover, we show that when returns to physical capital are
measured using broad stock market indexes, human capital return
innovations tend to be more correlated with foreign rather than
domestic stocks. Nevertheless, these correlations are small and,
consequently, in a frictionless complete market setting, have very
little impact on optimal portfolios.
27 For instance, US labor income return innovations have a correlation with foreign
stock market returns of 0.19–0.26 in the ﬁrst sub sample, and 0.02–0.18 in the second
subsample, while the correlation of US labor income innovation and USmarket returns
is about 0.04–0.10 in the ﬁrst subsample and between −0.01 and 0.01 in the second
subsample.
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Fourth, calibrating a buffer stock saving model consistent with
both micro and macro labor income dynamics—hence taking into
account that individual labor income uncertainty is substantially
larger than the aggregate one— as well as stock market data, we
show that a large home country bias arises as an equilibrium result.
This is due to the fact that household labor income risk is about
one order of magnitude larger than aggregate labor income risk and,
in the presence of liquidity constraints, optimal hedging becomes
heavily skewed toward the asset whose innovations have the lowest
correlation with the labor income innovations—the domestic asset.
Moreover, our heterogenous agents model implies that, at the
household level, the degree of home country bias should increase,
and portfolio diversiﬁcation decrease, in the labor income to ﬁnan-
cial wealth ratio—and these are exactly the novel empirical stylized
facts that we uncover in the 1992–2013 U.S. Survey of Consumer
Finances data.
A. Appendix
A.1. Data description
In order to allow for a direct comparison of our results with the
results of Baxter and Jermann (1997), we collect annual data on
labor income and capital income from the OECD National Accounts
for Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The data for
the period from 1960 to 2003 are available through ESDS Interna-
tional (http://www.esds.ac.uk). More recent data (i.e., data for the
period from 1970 to 2012) are available directly from the OECD’s iLi-
brary (http://stats.oecd.org/). Our measure of labor income is total
employee compensation paid by resident producers (Table 3, num-
ber 1). Our measure of capital income is GDP at factor cost (Table 3,
number 18) minus employee compensation.
This leaves us with two overlapping datasets that need to be
spliced to cover the full sample period from 1960 to 2012. Unfor-
tunately, the calculation standards for GDP have changed over time
and are thus slightly different for the two datasets. Therefore, we
cannot simply append more recent data to the older dataset, so we
use the ratio of GDP for one dataset in the year in which we splice
the data to GDP for the other dataset as a conversion rate. In our
baseline speciﬁcation, we augment the dataset from 1960 until 2003
with more recent data that is adjusted using the GDP ratio for the
year 2003 as a conversion rate. Appendix A.5 discusses the robust-
ness of our results with respect to the construction of the labor and
capital income data series.
Finally, the OECD National Accounts database for Germany refers
to data for the whole of Germany prior to the German reuniﬁcation,
using the ratio of GDP for West Germany to GDP for Germany as a
whole in 1991 as a conversion rate. Hence, to better take into account
the legal barriers to international investments faced by East Germans
prior to 1990, we construct labor and capital income series for West
Germany only by employing data from the German Statistical Oﬃce
( http://www.vgrdl.de/Arbeitskreis_VGR ).
The summary statistics of the labor and capital income series
are reported in Table A1. The sample averages of the labor shares
Table A1
Summary statistics.
Labor income Capital income Labor share
Germany Mean 190943 170547 0.530
(millions of euros) Std. deviation 62059 63631 0.029
Japan Mean 154322 121685 0.508
(billions of yen) Std. deviation 62670 46028 0.047
U.K. Mean 70719 53747 0.573
(millions of pounds) Std. deviation 19304 18160 0.025
U.S. Mean 150265 109329 0.580
(millions of dollars) Std. deviation 43485 34474 0.011
Note: The sample period is 1960–2012.
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Fig. A1. Locally weighted regressions of the share of foreign assets on the logarithm
of ﬁnancial wealth divided by a household’s labor income for different years of the U.S.
Survey of Consumer Finances.
of income reported in the table are the values for aj used in Eq.
(A2).
We retrieve the following stock market data from the Global
Financial Data (https://www.globalﬁnancialdata.com): CDAX Total
Return Index for Germany, Nikko Securities Composite Total Return
for Japan, FTSE All-Share Return Index for the United Kingdom, and
S&P 500 Total Return Index and Dow Jones Industrials Total Return
Index (DJ) for the United States. The Fama and French benchmark
return for the United States (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/
faculty/ken.french/data_library.html) is given by the sumof the Fama
and French excess market return and the risk-free rate.
In order to construct real per capita returns, we collect population
data and GDP ﬁgures deﬂator from the International Financial Statis-
tics service of the International Monetary Fund (available through
http://ukdataservice.ac.uk/).
Survey of Consumer Finances data and the corresponding
codebooks are available from the Federal Reserve (http://www.
federalreserve.gov/econresdata/scf/scﬁndex.htm). Data was col-
lected for 8 different surveys from 1992 to 2013. The questionnaires
are slightly different for different years. The questions regarding
foreign stock holdings, however, remain the same over time. Fig. A1
shows the results of locally weighted regressions of the share of
foreign assets on the logarithm of normalized ﬁnancial wealth, i.e.
ﬁnancial wealth divided by a household’s labor income.
A.2. Estimation of the aggregate labor income process
In order to model the U.S. labor income process, we experi-
mentedwith several speciﬁcations in the ARIMA class and performed
the standard set of Box–Jenkins selection procedures. In particu-
lar, among the models considered, MA(2) and ARMA(1,1) processes
ﬁt well to ﬁrst differences of log labor income. Since these speci-
ﬁcations deliver similar results, we henceforth restrict attention to
the ARIMA(0,1,2) speciﬁcation for log income since it simpliﬁes the
exposition and it has previously been used in the literature in simi-
lar contexts (see, e.g., Davis andWillen, 2000; MaCurdy, 1982). Thus,
Table A2
Estimated labor income process.
lˆy zˆ1 zˆ2 St. error of 4ˆ
0.0188 0.4475 0.0937 0.0214
(0.0045) (0.1501) (0.1556)
Note: Newey–West standard errors reported in brackets.
S92 L. Bretscher, et al. / Journal of International Economics 99 (2016) S78–S96
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
=
2
y
2
co
rr
e
la
tio
ns
corr(w, rk)
corr(w, rfkf | =.7)
corr(w, rfkf | =.47)
Fig. A2. Correlations of domestic wage and: domestic (solid line) and foreign (dashed
and dotted lines) capital compensation for different levels of international GDP
correlation (d).
the ﬁtted earning speciﬁcation is the MA(2) process Eq. (2). The
estimated coeﬃcients are reported in Table A2 below.
A.3. Rent shifting shocks and the home country bias
The empirical results obtained in Sections 2 and 3 stand in sharp
contrast with the canonical intuition that, in a competitive and fric-
tionless world with constant labor and capital income shares, payoffs
to domestic capital and labor are perfectly correlated. Therefore, if
outputs are not perfectly correlated across countries, human capi-
tal hedging should skew domestic portfolios toward foreign assets.
In this section, we present a stylized calibration exercise and show
that, once the degree of international economic integration observed
in the data is accounted for, very small redistributive shocks are suf-
ﬁcient to reverse this conclusion: that is, we show that the canonical
intuition is theoretically fragile.
Consider a simple two-country setting. The domestic output is
produced by a constant return to scale Cobb–Douglas production
function with constant elasticity of output to capital and labor
inputs—denoted respectively as a and 1 − a. Assume also that there
are additive redistributive shocks (g) to factor remuneration—that is
labor and capital compensation are given, respectively, by
w = (1 − a) y+ g
rk = ay − g
where y denotes domestic output per capita, w is the domestic wage
rate, r is the return on capital, k is the per capita stock of capital, and
for simplicity of exposition the redistributive shock g is assumed to
be a mean zero iid stochastic process.
Without loss of generality, assume that s2g = js
2
y , i.e. j mea-
sures the ratio between the variance of the redistributive shock (s2g )
and the per capita output variance (s2y ). Assume also that the for-
eign economy is characterized by the same structure as the domestic
economy, with s2y = s
2
yf
, jf = j, and af = a, where the superscript f
denotes quantities in the foreign country. Denote with d = corr(y, yf)
the correlation between domestic and foreign output (yf). It then
follows that
corr (w, rk) =
(1 − a)a − j√(
a2 + j
) [
(1 − a)2 + j
]
corr
(
w, rf kf
)
=
(1 − a)a√(
a2 + j
) [
(1 − a)2 + j
]d
where r fk f is the payout to capital invested in the foreign country,
implying that
sign
(
corr (w, rk) − corr
(
w, rf kf
))
= sign ((1 − a)a (1 − d) − j) .
This simple observations implies that for suﬃciently high volatil-
ity of the redistributive shock relative to output volatility—i.e., for
suﬃciently high j−the domestic asset becomes a better hedge for
human capital than the foreign asset. Moreover, this effect becomes
stronger when the correlation between domestic and foreign out-
put (d) increases. The relevant question is whether unrealistically
large redistributive shocks and cross-country output correlations are
needed for this effect to arise.
Calibrating the capital share of output as a = .3, Fig. A2 plots
the correlation between domestic labor income and domestic capi-
tal income (solid line), and the correlation of domestic labor income
with foreign capital income (for different values of d in the dashed
and dotted lines) as a function of j (the ratio of the redistributive
shocks variance to output variance). The two values of d consid-
ered are theminimum andmaximum correlations between domestic
output and world output reported in (Obsfteld and Rogoff, 1996,
page 291) for Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and
Japan.28 The ﬁgure shows that a redistributive shock with a vari-
ance that is a mere 6% (11%) of output variance is enough to make
the domestic asset a better hedge for human capital than the foreign
asset when the correlation between domestic and foreign output, d,
is 0.7 (0.46). That is, relatively small redistributive shocks are suﬃ-
cient to revert the intuition that, in a Cobb–Douglas world, hedging
labor income risk should skew domestic portfolios toward domes-
tic assets. A natural question is whether redistributive shocks of this
magnitude are realistic. A simple way to gauge the magnitude of j
is to compute the ratio of i) the variance of the residual of a lin-
ear regression of de-trended labor income on de-trended output, to
ii) the variance of de-trended output. Such an estimate delivers a
value for j in the four countries considered in our empirical analysis
(the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany during
the 1960–2012 period)29 that ranges from 0.06 to 0.48, when using
Hodrick and Prescott (1997) de-trending, and from 0.09 to 0.18when
using linear de-trending. That is, these estimates are in the range
needed to skew portfolio holdings toward domestic assets.30 More-
over, in the presence of rent shifting shocks, we would expect to
observe time variation in the labor share of income. Fig. A3 plots the
labor income share in total output in the four countries considered
in our empirical analysis. The ﬁgure shows substantial time variation
in the share of GDP received by the labor force.
Note also that the patterns in Fig. A3, from the late seventies
onward, show a negative trend in the labor share consistent with
the ﬁndings of Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013). These author
study a large cross-section of countries and document that the global
labor share has signiﬁcantly declined since the early 1980s, with the
decline occurring within the large majority of countries and indus-
tries, and with a 5 percentage point global decline in the labor share
since the late seventies.
28 Using an extended sample that runs until 2012, we ﬁnd much higher correlations,
hence the calibration reported in the ﬁgure is conservative.
29 A detailed description of the data used throughout the paper is reported in
Appendix A.1.
30 We ﬁnd very similar results if we gauge themagnitude of j by computing the ratio
of i) the variance of the residual of a linear regression of de-trended capital income on
de-trended output, to ii) the variance of de-trend output.
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A.4. Cointegration analysis
In this Appendix, we provide a battery of econometric tests on
the time series properties of labor and capital income in the four
countries in our sample.
Since both the Augmented Dickey–Fuller (Dickey and Fuller,
1981) and the Phillips–Perron (Phillips and Perron, 1988) tests can-
not reject the null hypothesis of unit roots in labor and capital
income (results not reported but available upon request), we inves-
tigate whether the logarithm of labor income shares a common
Table A3
Johansen cointegration test.
Country Number of Trace Max Likelihood
lags Eigenvalue ratio
Germany 0 20.22
(0.009)
19.80
(0.006)
15.32
(0.002)
1 11.377
(0.190)
9.504
(0.272)
7.196
(0.007)
2 10.159
(0.302)
8.59
(0.370)
6.39
(0.012)
3 10.48
(0.270)
8.34
(0.396)
5.49
(0.019)
Japan 0 54.96
(0.001)
51.84
(0.001)
4.36
(0.037)
1 27.42
(0.001)
22.86
(0.002)
3.70
(0.055)
2 17.40
(0.026)
12.06
(0.109)
4.37
(0.037)
3 30.04
(0.001)
26.04
(0.01)
19.83
(0.000)
United Kingdom 0 18.63
(0.016)
17.46
(0.015)
13.58
(0.000)
1 12.41
(0.0139)
9.91
(0.229)
4.98
(0.026)
2 11.30
(0.194)
8.39
(0.391)
5.23
(0.022)
3 12.30
(0.143)
10.48
(0.183)
7.62
(0.006)
United States 0 16.53
(0.035)
15.85
(0.028)
12.96
(0.000)
1 12.28
(0.144)
10.61
(0.175)
8.76
(0.003)
2 13.43
(0.100)
8.88
(0.339)
3.87
(0.049)
3 15.53
(0.049)
10.53
(0.180)
5.51
(0.019)
Note: Johansen cointegration test. The null hypothesis is no pairwise cointegration
between labor income and capital income within each country. We report the trace
and maximum eigenvalue test statistics for different lag speciﬁcations of the ﬁrst dif-
ferenced terms. The last column tests the restriction that the log ratio of labor income
to capital income is stationary, i.e., the log of labor income and the log of capital
income are cointegrated with cointegrating vector [1,−1] . We report the p-value of
the test statistics in parentheses.
stochastic trend with the logarithm of capital income, thus imply-
ing the existence of a pairwise cointegration relationshipwithin each
country.
Table A3 presents econometric evidence based on the Johansen
cointegration test (Johansen, 1995), in which we allow for a linear
deterministic trend in the data and an intercept (but not a trend) in
the cointegration vector. For each country, the table reports both the
trace statistics and the maximum eigenvalue statistics for different
lags speciﬁcations of the ﬁrst differenced terms. The last column of
Table A3 tests the restriction that the log ratio of labor income to
capital income is stationary, i.e., the log of labor income and the log
of capital income are cointegrated with cointegrating vector [1,−1].
The null hypothesis of no cointegration between labor and capital
income cannot be generally rejected at standard signiﬁcance levels
for all countries but Japan. Hence, the long-run restriction suggested
by Baxter and Jermann (1997) of pairwise cointegrationwithin coun-
tries is not supported by the data unless the number of lags in the
test equation is zero. The sensitivity of the result to the lag speciﬁca-
tion can be due to the low power of the cointegration test, stemming
perhaps from a small sample size.
In Fig. A1 we plot the log ratio of labor income to capital income
in the four countries in our sample. Simple visual inspection suggests
that the behavior of the log ratio of labor income to capital income
is not stationary. Indeed, as reported in the last column of Table A3,
a formal testing procedure based on the Johansen cointegrating test
strongly rejects the cointegration restriction for all countries.
We acknowledge that if labor and capital income are allowed to
have independent trends, then the ratio of labor income to capital
income either will grow without bound or approach zero asymp-
totically. Therefore, labor’s share will approach one or zero with
probability one. However, it is important to realize that the cointe-
gration tests are simply rejecting the hypothesis about the existence
of a pairwise cointegration relationship within each country, but are
completely silent about the existence of a long-run equilibrium rela-
tionship across countries. Moreover, since in this paper we do our
econometric analysis in levels, we allow for implicit cointegrating
relationships in the data.
A.5. Robustness of factor returns correlations
This section tests whether the correlation of the factor returns
presented in Table 8 are sensitive to the way we construct our data
series on labor income. As mentioned in Appendix A.1, our ﬁnal data
of labor and capital income stems from two different datasets that
are then combined. An immediate concern is whether the results of
this paper are robust to the different possible ways of combining the
two datasets. In particular, one could think of four different ways
of combining them: 1) augment the 1960–2003 dataset from 2003
onwards (baseline speciﬁcation); 2) augment the 1960–2003 dataset
from 1970 onwards; 3) augment the 1970–2012 dataset from 2003
backwards; 4) augment the 1970–2012 dataset from 1970 back-
wards. We opt for the ﬁrst alternative for several reasons. First, we
choose to augment the 1960–2003 dataset since this maximizes the
overlap with the data Baxter and Jermann (1997) used in their analy-
sis. Second, we decide to splice the datasets in the year 2003 because,
at that time, Germany had already reuniﬁed, and consequently the
data deﬁnitions are consistent across countries. Nevertheless, we
explore the robustness of our results by comparing them for the four
different alternatives.
In Table A4, we recalculate Table 8 for the four alternatives. The
results for alternatives 1) to 4) are reported clockwise, with the top
left part being identical to Table A5—our baseline speciﬁcation. The
results suggest that, keeping the year in which we splice ﬁxed, there
is essentially no difference in the correlations whether we extend
the 1960–2003 or the 1970–2012 dataset. This can be seen from
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Table A4
Correlation of factor returns using stock market data.
1) Augment 1960–2003 from 2003 onwards 2) Augment 1960–2003 from 1970 onwards
rGL r
J
L r
UK
L r
USA
L r
G
L r
J
L r
UK
L r
USA
L
rGK 0.118[−0.08,0.24]
0.138
[−0.8,0.24]
0.110
[−0.07,0.26]
0.145
[−0.04,0.27]
rGK 0.033[−0.14,0.20]
0.133
[−0.05,0.24]
0.097
[−0.06,0.24]
0.154
[−0.01,0.26]
rJK 0.122[−0.05,0.21]
0.071
[−0.09,0.19]
0.145
[−0.02,0.23]
0.194
[0.03,0.26]
rJK 0.150[−0.05,0.32]
0.167
[−0.07,0.28]
0.060
[−0.12,0.25]
0.178
[−0.02,0.32]
rUKK 0.130[−0.09,0.26]
0.105
[−0.12,0.23]
0.101
[−0.10,0.27]
0.149
[−0.06,0.29]
rUKK −0.101
[−0.22,0.10]
−0.016
[−0.15,0.16]
0.138
[−0.07,0.22]
0.169
[−0.04,0.23]
rUSAFF 0.000[−0.14,0.11]
−0.088
[−0.20,0.04]
0.031
[−0.10,0.15]
0.041
[−0.10,0.14]
rUSAFF 0.021[−0.13,0.15]
−0.00
[−0.16,0.10]
−0.069
[−0.18,0.09]
−0.033
[−0.16,0.11]
rUSADJ −0.017
[−0.18,0.12]
−0.147
[−0.27,0.01]
0.035
[−0.07,0.21]
0.006
[−0.10,0.18]
rUSADJ 0.069[−0.16,0.18]
0.014
[−0.21,0.13]
−0.045
[−0.18,0.15]
−0.017
[−0.17,0.16]
rUSASP 0.026[−0.11,0.12]
−0.076
[−0.19,0.05]
0.075
[−0.05,0.17]
0.070
[−0.06,0.16]
rUSASP 0.057[−0.12,0.15]
0.027
[−0.15,0.12]
−0.046
[−0.16,0.11]
−0.015
[−0.14,0.12]
3) Augment 1970–2012 from 2003 backwards 4) Augment 1970–2012 from 1970 backwards
rGL r
J
L r
UK
L r
USA
L r
G
L r
J
L r
UK
L r
USA
L
rGK 0.118[−0.08,0.23]
0.138
[−0.08,0.24]
0.110
[−0.07,0.26]
0.145
[−0.04,0.26]
rGK 0.033[−0.14,0.20]
0.133
[−0.05,0.32]
0.097
[−0.22,0.10]
0.154
[−0.14,0.13]
rJK 0.0123[−0.05,0.21]
0.071
[−0.09,0.19]
0.145
[−0.02,0.23]
0.195
[0.03,0.26]
rJK 0.150[−0.06,0.24]
0.168
[−0.07,0.28]
0.060
[−0.12,0.25]
0.178
[−0.02,0.32]
rUKK 0.128[−0.09,0.26]
0.105
[−0.12,0.23]
0.099
[−0.10,0.27]
0.147
[−0.06,0.29]
rUKK −0.010
[−0.22,0.10]
−0.016
[−0.15,0.16]
0.137
[−0.07,0.22]
0.169
[−0.04,0.23]
rUSAFF −0.001
[−0.14,0.11]
−0.088
[−0.20,0.04]
0.029
[−0.10,0.15]
0.039
[−0.10,0.14]
rUSAFF 0.022[−0.14,13]
−0.000
[−0.16,0.10]
−0.069
[−0.19,0.08]
−0.033
[−0.17,0.10]
rUSADJ −0.019
[−0.18,0.12]
−0.147
[−0.27,0.01]
0.087
[−0.07,0.21]
0.058
[−0.10,0.18]
rUSADJ 0.070[−0.16,0.18]
0.014
[−0.21,0.13]
−0.045
[−0.18,0.15]
−0.017
[−0.17,0.16]
rUSASP 0.024[−0.11,0.12]
−0.076
[−0.19,0.05]
0.073
[−0.06,0.17]
0.068
[−0.07,0.16]
rUSASP 0.058[−0.12,0.15]
0.027
[−0.15,0.12]
−0.047
[−0.16,0.11]
−0.016
[−0.14,0.12]
Note: Correlations of human capital returns with physical capital returns. Returns to human capital are estimated using a VAR speciﬁcation in levels with
two lags. Returns on physical capital are computed using stock market data (CDAX for Germany, Nikko Securities Composite for Japan, FTSE All-Share
Index for the United Kingdom, and Fama and French (FF), S&P 500 Total Return Index (SP), and Dow Jones Industrials Total Return Index (DJ) for the
United States). We report in brackets the 95% conﬁdence interval constructed using sampling-with-replacement raw residuals bootstrap based on 10,000
replications.
comparing the correlations vertically across tables. From a horizon-
tal comparison across tables, however, one can see that the choice
of the year in which we splice the datasets matters to some extent.
Nevertheless, the main result of the table, remain unchanged: U.S.
labor income returns innovations are always more correlated with
foreign, rather than domestic, stock market returns (this is the key
element for calibrating our buffer stock saving model).
Table A5
Value-weighted diversiﬁed portfolio with complete markets.
Shares in each country traded asset:
Investor nationality: Germany Japan U.K. U.S.
Panel A: rk measured from VAR and national accounts
Germany −0.225
[−0.76,0.55]
0.060
−0.28,0.31]
1.576
[0.64,2.16]
−0.411
[−1.21,0.62]
Japan 0.742
[−0.19,1.76]
−0.606
[−1.08,−0.21]
1.882
[0.63,2.84]
−1.017
[−2.22,0.51]
UK 0.230
[−0.56,1.17]
1.059
[0.53,1.34]
1.191
[−0.08,2.02]
−1.480
[−2.50,0.08]
USA 0.019
[−0.52,0.91]
0.054
[0.11,0.78]
0.786
[−0.30,1.41]
−0.341
[−1.23,0.87]
Panel B: rk measured using stock market returns
Germany 0.040
[0.04,0.05]
0.289
[0.28,0.29]
0.145
[0.14,0.16]
0.526
[0.51,0.53]
Japan 0.034
[0.03,0.04]
0.290
[0.28,0.29]
0.139
[0.13,0.15]
0.537
[0.52,0.54]
UK 0.039
[0.03,0.05]
0.287
[0.28,0.29]
0.147
[0.14,0.17]
0.527
[0.5,0.53]
USA 0.039
[0.03,0.05]
0.287
[0.28,0.29]
0.145
[0.14,0.17]
0.530
[0.51,0.54]
World share 0.043 0.293 0.150 0.516
Note: Diversiﬁed portfolio using stock market returns (CDAX for Germany, Nikko
Securities Composite for Japan, FTSE All-Share Index for the United Kingdom, and
Fama and French for the United States). Each cell displays the net demand by a resi-
dent of country j for the assets of country k expressed as a fraction of home country
(country j) marketable assets. We report in brackets the 95% conﬁdence interval con-
structed using sampling-with-replacement raw residuals bootstrap based on 10,000
replications.
A.6. Hedging human capital in a frictionless complete market
The correlation structure between physical and human capi-
tal returns reported in Table 7 is not suﬃcient to identify the
hedging behaviour without additional assumptions on the structure
of the economy. In the main body of the paper, we provide a model
of human capital hedging that accounts for both idiosyncratic and
aggregate labor income risk, as well as liquidity constraints andmar-
ket incompleteness. But in this subsection, we want to show that
the VAR misspeciﬁcation is the main driver behind the empirical
results on human capital hedging reported in the previous literature.
Moreover, we want to show that the estimates are characterized
by substantial uncertainty, making the conclusion of human capital
pushing toward overinvestment in foreign assets very far fetched. To
show this, we now assume—only for this sub-section—that the set
of international risky ﬁnancial assets provides perfect spanning for
human capital as in Bottazzi et al., 1996; Baxter and Jermann 1997.
In other words, we assume that there exists a linear combination of
domestic and foreign marketable assets that is perfectly correlated
with the return to domestic human capital returns.
Assuming complete spanning of human capital returns by the
stock market returns (as in Bottazzi et al., 1996; Baxter and Jermann,
1997), one can compute hedge portfolios for human capital risk via
simple linear projection. Each hedge portfolio is chosen such that it
hedges $ 1.00 of human capital income ﬂow. Let hjk be the weight of
the risky ﬁnancial asset of country k in the hedge portfolio of country
j residents. The hedge portfolio of country j, hj := [hj1,hj2, . . . ,hjK]
′
,
is given given by
hj = S−1Yj (A1)
where S is the K × K covariance matrix of returns on risky ﬁnancial
assets in the world portfolio, andYj is the K×1 vector of covariances
of ﬁnancial assets returns with the human capital return of country
j. Notice that since the hedge portfolio is constructed to hedge $ 1.00
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Fig. A4. Log ratio of labor income to capital income in Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
of human capital, there is no reason for the portfolio weights to add
to one.
Moreover, under the complete spanning assumption, one can also
compute optimal portfolios following the value-weighted approach
used in Baxter and Jermann (1997). The value-weighted portfolio
approach, without considering the human capital hedging for the
moment, follows from the two funds separation theorem (Merton,
1973): in a frictionless one-period economy with no asymmetric
information, in the presence of K ﬁnancial risky assets and a risk-free
asset, all individuals will hold a portfolio given by a linear com-
bination of the risk free asset and the market portfolio—i.e., the
value-weighted portfolio. As a consequence, the risky part of each
individual’s portfolio will have a composition identical to the market
portfolio. The extension of this approach to our international frame-
work is straightforward: in equilibrium each investor, independent
of his nationality, will hold a risky portfolio with a composition iden-
tical to theworld portfolio of risky ﬁnancial assets, i.e., each country’s
asset will be in the portfolio with a share equal to the share of the
country in the world portfolio of marketable risky assets. That is,
denoting with pk the fraction of country k risky marketable asset in
the world portfolio, we have that in the absence of human capital
risk, pk would be the share of country k asset in the portfolio of risky
ﬁnancial assets of each country.
In the presence of non-marketable human capital, portfolio hold-
ings will be adjusted due to the hedging motive. Therefore, the
portfolio of risky assets held by a country j individual will depend
also on the covariance of domestic returns to human capital and
(domestic and foreign) returns to physical capital. In particular, to
hedge the human capital risk, the net demand by a resident of
country j for the asset of country k expressed as a fraction of the
home country (country j) portfolio of ﬁnancial assets will be
pk
[
1+
1 − aj
aj
( 4∑
k=1
hjk
)]
− 1 − aj
aj
hjk, (A2)
where 1 − aj is the labor share of income in country j.
The last term in Eq. (A2) is the share of country k marketable
asset that has to be sold to hedge the human capital risk in country j.
The expression multiplying pk reﬂects the funds generated by selling
the investor’s endowment of the claim to domestic physical capital
and the portfolio that hedges the risks associated with human capital
wealth, i.e.,
1−aj
aj
(∑4
k=1 hjk
)
.
The value weighted optimal portfolios implied by the correlations
between human and physical capital returns in Table 8 are reported
in Table A5. Panel A focuses on the VAR and national accounts based
estimates of physical capital returns, while panel B use stock market
index returns.
Panel A shows that, after correcting the VAR misspeciﬁcation,
the Baxter and Jermann (1997) value-weighted approach leads to
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inconclusive results concerning the role of human capital for optimal
portfolio diversiﬁcation: large home bias is basically as likely as large
shorting of the domestic market.
Comparing the optimal in portfolios in panel B with the (rescaled
to sum up to one) world shares (pk) of the various countries’ stock
markets in the world market capitalization reported in the last row,
the table shows that the inclusion of human capital hedging motive
has basically no effect when the space of tradable claims to capital is
the one of publicly traded companies.
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